Arizona Case Law



WEST v. SALT RIVER AGR. IMP. & POWER, 179 Ariz. 619 (App. 1994)



880 P.2d 1165



Camest L. WEST, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross Appellee, v. The SALT RIVER



AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT AND POWER DISTRICT, a municipal corporation,



Defendant-Appellee, Cross Appellant.



No. 1 CA-CV 92-0272.



Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department A.



September 8, 1994.





Appeal from the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Cause No. CV

91-11680, Susan R. Bolton, J.

Page 620



[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES ARE

NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT

DISPLAYED.]

Page 621



Francis> <G>. <Fanning>, Mesa, for plaintiff-appellant.



Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C. by J. Matthew Powell, Gerald

W. Alston, Phoenix, for defendant-appellee.



OPINION



GERBER, Acting Presiding Judge.



Appellant Camest West (West) sued his former employer, appellee

Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power District (SRP),

alleging that SRP discriminated against him on the basis of his

age by causing him to retire before he was required to do so.

West appeals from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in

favor of SRP. We conclude that as a matter of law West failed to

show that he was constructively discharged and thus did not

establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Therefore,

we affirm the trial court.



SRP cross-appeals from the trial court's denial of its

application for an award of attorneys' fees. Because the trial

court acted within its discretion, we affirm the trial court in

the cross-appeal.



FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY



West worked for SRP for more than twenty-four years. At the

time of his retirement from SRP, he was the internal audit

manager, an executive position, and reported directly to the SRP

president.



West's sixty-fifth birthday was on December 5, 1989. In June

1988, he talked to his human resources representative, Nacho

Orozco, about his retirement benefits. West believed that he

would have to work for about twenty-four months past his

sixty-fifth birthday to have a retirement income that would meet

his projected budget. However, he asked Orozco whether he could

work for only three months after he turned sixty-five.



Orozco told West that he thought West might not be able to work

beyond his sixty-fifth birthday due to SRP's mandatory executive

retirement policy, HR 515. Policy HR 515 provided that an

employee was required to retire by the end of the month in which

the employee's sixty-fifth birthday occurred if:



A. For the two-year period immediately preceding

retirement, the employee is a bona fide executive

or high policymaker; and,



B. The employee is entitled upon retirement to an

immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit

from a pension, profit sharing, savings, or deferred

compensation plan, or any combination of any such

plans of the Project, which equals, in the aggregate,

at least $44,000.



Orozco gave West a copy of HR 515. West admitted that he did not

notice the "and" between paragraphs A and B and thus thought that

if he was a bona fide executive or high policymaker, HR 515

applied to him regardless of the amount of his retirement

benefits.



A few weeks after their first meeting, Orozco told West that he

did not believe HR 515 applied to West. However, he also told

West that Dick Williams, who administered executive compensation

plans, and Williams's supervisor, Nollie Carlier, had said that

West could not work for three months beyond his

Page 622

sixty-fifth birthday. Jane Alfano, the head of SRP's legal

department, told West that she did not believe HR 515 applied to

him because she did not think he was an executive or high

policymaker. West disagreed with Alfano, but he did not tell her

so.



In June 1989, West received a letter from the SRP Retirement

Committee. The letter outlined estimated monthly pensions payable

to him under various alternatives, assuming that he retired on

December 31, 1989. The highest monthly benefit available to him

was $2,265.87, which is $27,190.44 per year. The letter opened

with the statement, "The Retirement Committee is required to

advise you that you are eligible for normal retirement the month

following your 65th birthday." However, he misread the letter and

thought it meant that he was required to retire on December 31,

1989.



Also in June 1989, West again visited with Orozco, at Orozco's

request, regarding West's retirement. Orozco told West that as

far as he knew, West would be able to extend his employment by

three months if he so desired. West did not recall any other

conversations with Orozco about his retirement after June 1989.

Orozco, however, believed he talked to West in October 1989 and

may have suggested to West that he would have to retire at age

sixty-five.



In October 1989, Alfano concluded that West was a bona fide

executive under HR 515, paragraph A. Dick Williams was asked to

determine whether paragraph B of HR 515 applied to West. He

concluded that West's pension would be less than $44,000 a year.

Thus, HR 515 did not apply to West, and he was not required to

retire at age sixty-five. West did not know that SRP officials

were trying to determine whether HR 515 applied to him, and they

did not advise him of their conclusion that HR 515 did not

require his retirement.



Because West felt he had not received a definitive response as

to whether he could continue to work after he reached age

sixty-five, he talked to John Lassen, SRP's president and his

supervisor. West told Lassen that he had checked with Orozco and

the human resources and law departments and they had said it

would probably be all right if he worked three months beyond

December. West asked if that arrangement was acceptable, and

Lassen said it was fine with him.



In February or March 1990, West asked Lassen if he could extend

his retirement date to June 30, 1990 to take advantage of a

gain-sharing plan that would be available to him if he worked

until that date. Although West felt that Lassen's demeanor

indicated that he was not happy with the request, Lassen said

that West could extend his retirement date to June 30.



In late March, Lassen asked West to put his June 30 retirement

date in writing. At that time, official notification of

retirement was to be submitted six months prior to retirement. On

April 2, 1990, West submitted a memorandum to Lassen that

confirmed June 30, 1990 as his retirement date, expressed his

feeling that SRP had been the best company he had worked for

"because of its concern for employees," and thanked SRP executive

management for its understanding and strong support of his

efforts. West also submitted a completed retirement form that

contained the provision that he could not postpone retirement

beyond June 30, 1990, except with the approval of his management

and the employee relations manager.



West has acknowledged that he never asked Lassen if HR 515

applied to him or if he could work for more than three or six

months past his sixty-fifth birthday. Lassen never told West that

he had to retire on a particular date and never discussed West's

retirement with him until West raised the issue. West did not

tell Lassen that he did not want to retire or that he thought he

had to retire. West never asked Lassen if he could leave his

retirement date open or extend it past June 30. West has also

acknowledged that no one at SRP ever told him either orally or in

writing that he had to retire at age sixty-five. However, he felt

that the general atmosphere at SRP created pressure on him to

retire at age sixty-five, so he tried to avoid bringing attention

to the issue of his retirement.



West retired on June 30, 1990. The day after he retired, his

department was reorganized in accordance with a reorganization

Page 623

process initiated before he retired. He believed that if he had

been employed on July 1, he would have been eligible for a

severance package. In November 1990, SRP also offered a severance

package to any employee who was over fifty-five and had

sufficient service to be entitled to benefits.



In May 1991, West filed a complaint against SRP. He alleged

that SRP led him to reasonably believe that he was required to

retire on or about his sixty-fifth birthday pursuant to SRP's

policy. He also alleged that SRP demanded his commitment to

retire by June 30, 1990, in order to deprive him of severance

benefits he would have been entitled to had he been employed on

July 1, 1990. He asserted that he was not covered by SRP's

mandatory retirement policy and that to the extent SRP

interpreted the policy to include him, the policy was in

violation of provisions of the Arizona Civil Rights Act, Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. (A.R.S.) section 41-1463, and the Federal Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623

and 631. He sought an award of back pay and benefits including

severance pay and enhancement of retirement benefits. He also

alleged that by denying him severance benefits, SRP breached a

contract with him.



SRP moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to

judgment because evidence from West's deposition established that

he voluntarily retired after he misread the executive retirement

policy and thought it applied to him. SRP pointed out that he

acknowledged that no SRP official told him he had to retire at

age sixty-five.



In response, West argued that it was not incumbent on him to

prove that anyone advised him that he must retire and that the

confusion, innuendo and subtle pressures created by SRP's agents

were enough to make out a claim of age discrimination. He also

argued that the conditions at SRP were so intolerable that his

retirement constituted a constructive discharge.



The trial court found that West had failed to come forward with

any facts supporting his claim for age discrimination or breach

of a severance agreement. It thus granted SRP's motion for

summary judgment but declined to award attorneys' fees to SRP.

West timely appealed from the judgment in favor of SRP, and SRP

cross-appealed from the denial of its application for attorneys'

fees.



DISCUSSION



A. Summary Judgment



Because this is an appeal from summary judgment, this court

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who

opposed the motion. World Investments, Inc. v. Harber's Estate,

17 Ariz. App. 107, 109, 495 P.2d 877, 879 (1972). Summary

judgment is properly granted "if the facts produced in support of

the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the

quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not

agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim

or defense." Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309,

802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990).



B. Appeal Issues



West argues on appeal that he need not prove that anyone at SRP

directly advised him that he had to retire at age sixty-five. He

maintains that the confusion, innuendo and subtle pressures that

were created by SRP's agents through the use of HR 515 and their

failure to advise him that HR 515 did not apply to him are enough

to make out a claim of age discrimination.



He further argues that SRP's violation of the ADEA did not have

to be willful and that he may prevail if he shows that SRP

violated the ADEA through misrepresentation and manipulation.

According to West, he established direct evidence that created an

inference that an illegal motivation and a general prejudice

against a particular age class influenced SRP's actions

concerning him such that the burden was shifted to SRP to prove a

legitimate basis for its actions. He also argues that the facts

create a triable issue as to whether he was constructively

discharged.



In response, SRP argues that the evidence shows that West

voluntarily retired more than six months after his sixty-fifth

birthday on a date that he chose. It asserts that because no one

at SRP told him he had to retire, as a matter of law SRP did not

violate

Page 624

the ADEA. According to SRP, the record shows that it did not

cause him to believe he was subject to HR 515 because it made no

attempt to apply or enforce the policy as to him. It points out

that the only two SRP employees (Orozco and Alfano) who made any

representation to him regarding HR 515 told him that the policy

did not apply to him. It further notes that his mistaken belief

that HR 515 required him to retire resulted from his misreading

of the policy and a letter he received from the retirement

committee, not from any representation by an SRP employee.



The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the

workplace based on age." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.

Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621, 83 L.Ed.2d 523

(1985), quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct.

866, 868, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). To establish a violation of the

ADEA where an employee is discharged from employment, the

plaintiff must ultimately prove by the preponderance of the

evidence that age was a determining factor in the employer's

discharge decision. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,

990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 1993).



Initially, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a

prima facie case of age discrimination. Hebert v. Mohawk

Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989). A prima facie

case may be made by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory

intent, or by satisfying all elements of the test established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817,

36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), or by statistical proof of a pattern of

discrimination. Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America,

758 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985).



West alleges that the facts of his situation provide direct

evidence of discriminatory intent. According to the Clark

court, "evidence of age discrimination is direct when, if

believed, it establishes discriminatory intent without inference

or presumption. Only the most blatant remarks whose intent could

only be to discriminate on the basis of age constitute direct

evidence." Clark, 990 F.2d at 1226 (citation omitted). Taking

West's factual allegations as true, the evidence cannot establish

discriminatory intent on the part of SRP without inference or

presumption. West acknowledges that no one at SRP told him he had

to retire at age sixty-five nor did anyone take any action to

force him to retire by a certain date. He chose the date on which

he would retire. Moreover, West presented no evidence that

Lassen's request that he put his retirement date in writing was

motivated by anything other than SRP's policy that notice of

retirement be given months in advance of the retirement date.



Because West did not produce direct evidence of discriminatory

intent, an alternative method of establishing a prima facie

case must be used if he is to prevail. The method of showing a

pattern of discrimination does not apply because no statistical

evidence of age discrimination at SRP was produced. Under the

McDonnell Douglas test method, West must show that he (1) was

in the protected age group, (2) was qualified for the position

held and was performing the position satisfactorily, (3) was

discharged either actually or constructively, and (4) was

replaced by someone[fn1] with equal or lesser qualifications.

See Hebert, 872 F.2d at 1110, and Cassino v. Reichhold

Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1987).



At age sixty-five, West clearly was in the protected group. He

was qualified for the position he held, and the implication from

the record is that SRP thought he was doing a satisfactory job.

SRP did not fire West. Therefore, the question becomes whether

SRP forced him to retire and thus constructively discharged him.

Page 625



"To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by

constructive discharge, an employee must prove that his `employer

by its illegal discriminatory acts has made working conditions so

difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's position

would feel compelled to resign.'" Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp.,

896 F.2d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 1990). "The inquiry focuses on the

employee's state of mind, and the employer's intent in creating

the allegedly intolerable conditions is irrelevant at this

stage." Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir.

1986). Nevertheless, the test is objective because it turns on

the reaction of a "reasonable employee" in the plaintiff's

position rather than on the plaintiff's actual reaction. Id.



Determining whether conditions were so intolerable and

discriminatory that a reasonable employee would have been

justified in resigning or retiring is normally a question for the

trier of fact. Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.

1989). To establish constructive discharge, the plaintiff must

show some aggravating factor such as a continuous pattern of

discriminatory intent. Id. Absent such a showing, the court may

find that as a matter of law the plaintiff was not constructively

discharged. See Id. (insufficient evidence of any aggravating

factors of differential, discriminatory or retaliatory treatment

by employer from which trier of fact could conclude that a

reasonable person would have been compelled to quit; appellees

entitled to judgment on wrongful constructive discharge claim as

matter of law).



In Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559 (1st Cir.

1986), Calhoun contended that his employer entered into a course

of action designed to force him into early retirement at age

sixty-two. Calhoun's supervisor repeatedly asked him whether he

intended to take early retirement, replaced Calhoun with a

younger man and demoted Calhoun with no cut in pay, excluded

Calhoun from training, and told Calhoun that if he continued on

the job he would have to work twelve to fourteen hour days and

Saturdays. Id. at 561-62. The court concluded that the events

taken together compared favorably enough with fact patterns in

successful age discrimination cases that summary judgment would

be improper. Id. at 563. The Calhoun court cited the

following cases as examples of conduct sufficient to establish

constructive discharge: Cockrell v. Boise Cascade Corp.,

781 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1986) (choice of transfer to lower paying job

or resignation); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,

770 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1985) (demotion without warning or reprimand);

Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, 758 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir.

1985) (several inquiries about retirement plans along with

humiliating demotion, even with same pay and benefits).



The only occurrences that West cites on appeal as constituting

facts supporting constructive discharge are that he was told that

he might be required by HR 515 to retire at age sixty-five, he

was not informed of this error when discovered by management, and

his supervisor asked him to commit in writing to the retirement

date he requested. These actions by SRP do not constitute

intolerable and discriminatory working conditions necessary to

establish constructive discharge. West may have been

exceptionally sensitive to any suggestion that he might have to

retire at age sixty-five. However, SRP did not alter his working

conditions nor say or do anything to him that would have caused a

reasonable person to feel that he was being forced to retire.



In addition, the facts in the record show that West did not

give SRP any indication that he wished to work indefinitely past

age sixty-five. He asked Orozco for only a three-month extension

past age sixty-five when it appeared that the policy might apply

to him. SRP did not send West any forms to fill out or in any

other way indicate that it expected him to retire in December

1989. The record shows that the impression he gave SRP officials

about his retirement was that he was excited about retiring; for

instance, he had someone take a picture of him as he signed the

notice of retirement. He did not do anything to put SRP on notice

that he thought HR 515 applied to him such that SRP could be said

to have constructively discharged him by failing to tell him that

HR 515 definitely did not apply to him.

Page 626



West argues that he should prevail because he demonstrated that

although SRP may not have committed a willful, direct violation

of the ADEA, it violated the act through misrepresentation and

manipulation. Clearly, a violation of the ADEA need not be

willful for an employee to prevail in an age discrimination

case.[fn2] However, the employee still must be able to establish

a prima facie case of discrimination. As West did not establish

a prima facie case, the question of SRP's willfulness is

irrelevant.



Given the factual allegations and evidence presented by West,

there was no constructive discharge as a matter of law.

Therefore, West cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test nor

any of the other possible methods of establishing a prima facie

case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of SRP.



C. Cross-Appeal



On cross-appeal, SRP argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying its request for an award of attorneys' fees

pursuant to A.R.S. sections 41-1481(J) and 12-341.01. The denial

of attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial court,

and this court will not overrule such a decision if it is

reasonably supported by the record. Johns v. Dept. of Economic

Sec., 169 Ariz. 75, 81, 817 P.2d 20, 26 (App. 1991).



A prevailing defendant in a civil rights action may be awarded

fees pursuant to A.R.S. section 41-1481(J) only upon a finding

that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or

without foundation, even if it was not brought in subjective bad

faith. Sees v. KTUC, Inc., 148 Ariz. 366, 369, 714 P.2d 859,

862 (App. 1985). Thus, the fact that a defendant prevails on the

merits does not in itself entitle the defendant to an award of

fees. Id.



The trial court ruled that West's case was not frivolous,

unreasonable or without foundation. The trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying an award of fees on that basis. After

the initial confusion about whether HR 515 applied to West, the

fact that SRP officials determined that he was not subject to

this policy but did not tell him provides at least an arguable

basis for his allegation of age discrimination. Therefore, we

affirm the denial of the fee request under section 41-1481(J).



SRP also argues that it was entitled to an award of fees under

A.R.S. section 12-341.01 because one of West's claims was for

breach of contract. The trial court has discretion to grant such

an award. Wheel Estate Corp. v. Webb, 139 Ariz. 506, 508,

679 P.2d 529, 531 (App. 1983). The contractual claim involved

Lassen's alleged promise that he would recommend West for a

severance package if he qualified for one, and it played a very

minor part in the litigation below. We find that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a fee

award.



D. Attorneys' Fees on Appeal



SRP requests an award of its attorneys' fees incurred in this

appeal pursuant to A.R.S. section 41-1481(J) and Rule 21(c),

Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Because West did not

pursue his breach of contract claim on appeal, SRP does not ask

for fees under section 12-341.01. For the reasons that we affirm

the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees, we deny SRP's

request for an award of fees on appeal.



McGREGOR and CONTRERAS, JJ., concur.



[fn1] The Circuit Courts also require the replacement to be

"younger," Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 206-07

(5th Cir. 1986), Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1153

(10th Cir. 1990); "substantially younger," Cassino v. Reichhold

Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1987); or

"outside the protected group," Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,

990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir. 1993), Burlew v. Eaton Corp.,

869 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989); but compare "need not be

younger or outside protected group," Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber

Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989).



[fn2] The question of willfulness in age discrimination generally

comes into play in two situations. One is on the issue of whether

the two-year statute of limitations for nonwillful violations of

the ADEA or the three-year statute of limitations for willful

violations applies. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,

486 U.S. 128, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). The other is to

determine whether liquidated damages may be awarded; double back

pay may be awarded as liquidated damages only if an employer

acted willfully in violating the ADEA. See, e.g., Thurston, 469

U.S. at 126, 105 S.Ct. at 624; Burlew, 869 F.2d at 1064 & n. 2.

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